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Are Absolute Bans on Assisted Suicide
Constitutional? I Say No
ROBERT A. SEDLER*
I am going to divide the question into two parts. Are government
bans on assisted suicide constitutional? The answer is yes. Is it consti-
tutional for the government to absolutely prohibit terminally ill per-
sons in the end stages of their terminal illness from making the choice
to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed medica-
tions? Here I submit that the answer is no. I will be presenting to you
the arguments that I have presented in my writings,' and that have
formed the basis of the ACLU's constitutional challenge to Michigan's
ban on assisted suicide.
2
Michigan's ban on assisted suicide is absolute and clearly prohib-
its the terminally ill in the end stages of their terminal illness from
making the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-
prescribed medications. Make no mistake about it, Michigan's ban on
assisted suicide is specifically directed against the terminally ill. Prior
to the entry of Dr. Kevorkian on the scene, Michigan did not have a
law against assisted suicide, although one was hastily crafted in reac-
tion to his activities.' While many states did have such a law, these
laws were never enforced; it is virtually impossible to find a prosecu-
tion under an assisted suicide law for helping someone blow his brains
out or jump off a bridge.' It was only when terminally ill people be-
gan to assert their right to hasten inevitable death with the assistance
of a physician that American society began to debate the matter of
assisted suicide. The Supreme Court has said that "the proper focus
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B.,1956, J.D.,1959, University of
Pittsburgh.
1. See Robert A. Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on "Assisted Suicide": The
Vriewfrom Without and Within, 21 HASTINS CONST. L.Q. 777 (1994); Robert A. Sedler,
The Constitution and Hastening Inevitable Death, HASTNGS CENTER REP., Sept.-Oct. 1993,
at 20.
2. The ACLU's challenge, Hobbins v. Attorney Genera4 was consolidated before
the Michigan Supreme Court with two cases involving "assisted suicide's" most visible
practitioner, Dr. Jack Kevorkian. On December 13, 1994, the Michigan Supreme
Court, in a 5-2 decision, rejected those constitutional arguments and upheld the con-
stitutionality of the challenged Michigan law. People v. Kevorkian; Hobbins v. Attor-
ney General, 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995).
3. See MicH. Comp. LAws. ANN. § 752.1027 (West 1993).
4. Research has disclosed only one reported case involving such a prosecution.
In State v. Bauer, 471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), a 17-year-old defendant was
convicted of aiding a suicide and fetal homicide, when his 18-year-old girlfriend, who
was pregnant with his child, killed herself as part of a purported "suicide pact" be-
tween them. He furnished the gun that she used to kill herself, but claimed that he
tried to talk her out of it, and that she killed herself as he walked away.
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of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction,
not the group for whom the law is irrelevant."5 So, the focus of our
constitutional inquiry will not be on the people, if there are such, who
want help in jumping off a bridge or in blowing their brains out-the
law is irrelevant for them. The focus of our constitutional inquiry will
be on the terminally ill for whom the law is indeed a restriction-the
people who are denied the choice in the end stages of their terminal
illness to make the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of
physician-prescribed medications.
Because the question that I will be addressing is one of constitu-
tional law, I will be approaching it as a lawyer must approach a consti-
tutional question-with reference to applicable constitutional
doctrine and precedents of the United States Supreme Court. The
question then is not whether allowing the terminally ill to have the
choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed
medications is desirable social policy. The question is not whether
this will have ramifications for our views about death and dying or the
sanctity of human life. The question is whether, under applicable
Supreme Court doctrine and precedent, an absolute ban on terminally ill
persons having the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of
physician-prescribed medications is constitutional. Only the United
States Supreme Court, of course, can give the definitive answer to this
question. In this sense, I cannot say that such a ban is unconstitu-
tional, and Professor Kamisar, my opponent in this debate, cannot say
that such a ban is constitutional. I am not on the Supreme Court, and
neither is Professor Kamisar; although, there are many who would say
that Professor Kamisar, who is one of the Nation's most distinguished
constitutional scholars, should be. But he isn't, at least not yet. So,
what I will do is to present the arguments, based on applicable
Supreme Court doctrine and precedent, as to why I think the
Supreme Court should hold that such a ban is unconstitutional. I
would hope that Professor Kamisar will limit his opposing arguments
to applicable Supreme Court doctrine and precedent as well-
although if his writings on the subject are any indication, he will make
arguments that go rather far afield from applicable Supreme Court
doctrine and precedent.6
First, as to assisted suicide, of course the state can constitutionally
prohibit assisting a suicide in the ordinary sense of the term-that is,
providing assistance in ending a life that is otherwise of indefinite du-
ration, such as by jumping off a bridge or blowing one's brains out.
There is no constitutional right to commit suicide. Regardless of what
some may think, the law does not recognize any notion of a "rational
5. Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837-38 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, HAS-
TINGS CENTER REp., May-June 1993, at 32.
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suicide." The legal view is that someone who attempts suicide may be
suffering from a form of mental illness at that time, so that the at-
tempt at suicide is considered to be pathological and irrational. It is
well-settled that the government may, consistent with due process, im-
pose restrictions on a person's freedom in order to prevent that per-
son from doing something that the legislature reasonably considers
harmful to that person's health or safety.7 This principle-that the
government has the power to protect us from ourselves-is relied on
to sustain a host of restrictions on individual freedom, such as sub-
stance abuse laws, cyclist helmet laws, and seatbelt laws. It is also re-
lied on to sustain the involuntary commitment of a person who is a
"danger to [himself]."8 Likewise, the principle would be relied on by
the courts to sustain a ban on assisted suicide in the ordinary sense of
the term. So, as a constitutional matter, we need not worry about a
"slippery slope." A Supreme Court holding that terminally ill persons
in the end stages of their terminal illness have a constitutional right to
make the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-
prescribed medications will not be the first step in establishing what
Professor Kamisar calls a "suicide permissive" society.9 It will simply
be a holding about the terminally ill and their right to choose to
hasten inevitable death.
We now come back to the constitutional right of the terminally ill
to make this choice. Professor Kamisar and other opponents of "as-
sisted suicide" are reluctant to talk directly about the terminally ill.
They only say that if the terminally ill choose to die one moment
before they breathe their last agonizing breath, they are committing
suicide, and since there is no right to commit suicide, the state can
force the terminally ill to endure unbearable pain and suffering until
death comes "naturally."'" This kind of syllogistic reasoning has no
place in constitutional analysis. Again, the question is whether, under
applicable constitutional doctrine and precedent, the Constitution
protects the right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten
inevitable death, and if so, whether the state can assert any conceiva-
bly valid interest in denying them assistance in implementing that
choice. It is that question to which we will now turn.
7. This principle is recognized in early cases sustaining against due process chal-
lenges the constitutionality of laws limiting the hours that an employee could work on
the ground that the laws were necessary to protect employee health. See, e.g., Bunting
v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (manufacturing); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (hours of work for women); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (under-
ground mining).
8. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2644-47 (1993).
9. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 39.
10. Professor Kamisar contends that for constitutional purposes, there is no prin-
cipled way to distinguish between terminally ill persons seeking to hasten their inevi-
table death and anybody else desiring "death by suicide." Id. at 36.
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It may be asked first, what do I mean by the terminally ill? The
constitutional answer to that question, like the constitutional answer
to the question of "when is a fetus viable," so that the physician may
not perform an abortion, is that it is to be determined by the reason-
able medical judgment of the physician." It is my understanding that
physicians consider a person to be terminally ill when that person will
die from a specific disease within a relatively short period of time.
There is no medical treatment that can arrest the path of the disease
toward inevitable death, and medical treatment is limited to alleviat-
ing the pain. The only thing that is not certain is the precise time
when death will occur. In practice, there is no difficulty at all in deter-
mining who is terminally ill. Obviously, the terminally ill person will
not seek to hasten inevitable death until the end stage of the terminal
illness has been reached. At that point in time, the question is
whether that person will have the choice to hasten inevitable death-
to determine the timing of death-or whether that person must con-
tinue to suffer until she breathes her last agonizing breath.
The constitutional answer to that question, as I have said, must be
found in applicable Supreme Court doctrine and precedent. Here
the doctrine and precedent applicable to the concept of personal au-
tonomy that is embodied in the "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. In its 1992 decision in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,' 2 where the Court reaffirmed a woman's constitu-
tional right to a pre-viability abortion, the Court authoritatively set
forth the constitutional doctrine applicable to the protection of the
right of personal autonomy. The Court stated as follows:
It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of
personal liberty which the government may not enter .... It
is settled now that the Constitution places limits on a State's
right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood, as well as bodily integrity .... At the
heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compul-
sion of the state.' 3
Applying this doctrine, I submit that the right to define one's own
concept of existence and to make the most basic decisions about bod-
ily integrity surely must include the right of terminally ill persons to
make the choice whether to hasten inevitable death or whether to go
on living until death comes naturally.
11. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
12. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. Id. at 847-52.
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We now turn to the precedents. A person's entitlement to bodily
integrity and control over that person's own body protects the per-
son's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, including the right
of a competent adult person to make the personal decision to discon-
tinue life-saving medical treatment.' 4 It protects the right of men and
women to use contraception and to have themselves sterilized. 5 And
above all, it protects the light of a woman to choose to have a pre-
viability abortion, even though this will destroy the potential human
life of the fetus that she is carrying.' 6 Surely, if a woman's right to
control over her own body includes the right to have an abortion,
when that same woman at a later stage of her life becomes terminally
ill, her right to control her own body must include her right to make
decisions about the voluntary termination of her own life during the
end stages of her terminal illness.
Professor Kamisar has said that there is a difference between with-
holding or withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment and what he
calls "affirmatively committing suicide," by which he means terminally
ill persons making the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of
physician-prescribed medications. 7
This is true. There is also a difference between contraception
and abortion, but both abortion and contraception are protected by
the constitutional right of personal autonomy. Professor Kamisar can-
not explicate any principled difference, in terms of constitutional doctrine
and precedent, between the right of a competent terminally ill person to
hasten inevitable death by refusing life-sustaining medical treatment
and the right of the same competent terminally ill person to hasten
inevitable death by the use of physician-prescribed medications. I
challenge him to do so. I likewise challenge him to explain why-in
terms of constitutional doctrine and precedent-a woman has a con-
stitutional right to terminate her pregnancy by a pre-viability abortion,
but does not have the same right when, in a later stage of her life, she
becomes terminally ill, to make the choice to hasten inevitable death
by the use of physician-prescribed medications.
I submit, therefore, that in light of applicable Supreme Court
doctrine and precedent, the right of the terminally ill to make the
choice to hasten inevitable death is a fundamental right, protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause against improper
governmental interference.
The government cannot assert any conceivably valid interest in
denying the terminally ill person the right to make the choice to
hasten inevitable death and hence require that person to undergo un-
14. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
15. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
16. Casey, 505 U.S. 833; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
17. Kamisar, supra note 6, at 33-35.
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bearable pain and suffering until death comes naturally. The govern-
ment typically tries to justify a ban on "assisted suicide" on the ground
that it has an interest in "preserving life." But for the terminally ill there is
no life left to preserve. The terminally ill person is dying. The body has
lost its struggle with disease. There is no medical treatment that can
arrest the path of the disease toward inevitable death. The only ques-
tion is whether the terminally ill person must undergo unbearable suf-
fering until death comes naturally or whether that person can end the
unbearable suffering by the use of physician-prescribed medications.
The government can have no valid interest whatsoever in prolonging
dying, and in forcing terminally ill people to go on suffering until they
have breathed their last agonizing breath.
In Casey, the Supreme Court held that the government may not
impose an undue burden on the exercise of a person's fundamental
right to bodily integrity.18 In that case, the Court held that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit a woman from having a pre-viability abor-
tion. 9 It also held that the government may not require notification
to a married woman's husband of her intention to have an abortion,
since the threat that her husband may commit an act of violence
against her would effectively deter a small number of women from
making the decision to have an abortion.2"
An absolute ban on a terminally ill person's receiving any assist-
ance from a physician, or any other person, in implementing her
choice to hasten inevitable death is obviously an undue burden on her
fundamental right of bodily integrity. It would prevent the terminally
ill person from making use of physician-prescribed medications to
hasten inevitable death by consuming a sufficient quantity of those
medications. There is no question, of course, that the government, in
the exercise of its power to impose reasonable regulations on the
practice of medicine, could constitutionally regulate physician partici-
pation in assisting the hastening of inevitable death. For example, the
government might limit physician participation in hastening inevita-
ble death to practicing clinical physicians and/or to clinical physicians
who have been directly involved in the care of the terminally ill pa-
tient. Such regulations would be constitutional so long as they did not
impose an undue burden on the choice of the terminally ill person to
hasten inevitable death. But an absolute ban on the use of physician-
prescribed medications to enable the terminally ill person to make the
choice to hasten inevitable death is, to say the least, an undue burden
on the exercise of that person's fundamental right. Indeed, a more
extreme burden on the exercise of a fundamental right cannot be
imagined.
18. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-81.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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It is for these reasons, applying applicable Supreme Court doc-
trine and precedent, that I would submit that an absolute ban on ter-
minally ill persons making the choice to hasten inevitable death by the
use of physician-prescribed medications is unconstitutional.
A final point. We are talking about a constitutional right of choice,
the right to make the choice whether or not to hasten inevitable
death. What is protected by the Constitution is choice in matters of
personal autonomy. The Constitution protects the choice of a preg-
nant woman to terminate a pregnancy by a pre-viability abortion. The
same Constitution protects the choice of a pregnant woman to con-
tinue her pregnancy, and precludes the state from forcing her to have
an abortion for any reason whatsoever. By the same token, the same
Constitution that protects the right of the terminally ill to make the
choice to hasten inevitable death equally protects the right of the ter-
minally ill to make the choice not to hasten inevitable death. Profes-
sor Kamisar and other proponents of sweeping bans on "assisted
suicide" posit the horror of the slippery slope. They say that if we
allow terminally ill people to make the choice to hasten inevitable
death, we are but one step away from putting all old and sick people
on the modem equivalent of an "ice floe going out to sea" in an at-
tempt to rid ourselves of the "inconvenience" of having to take care of
them.21 From a constitutional standpoint, the "slippery slope" argu-
ment is complete nonsense. As I have said, the same Constitution that
protects the right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten
inevitable death also protects the right of the terminally ill to make
the choice not to hasten inevitable death and to go on living until
death comes naturally. Thus, I would submit that their constitutional
right of choice would preclude the government from denying them
the medical treatment that is necessary to enable them to go on living.
22
In the final analysis, it is the choice principle that provides a rea-
soned basis for resolving the controversy over the right of terminally
ill people to hasten inevitable death. And this, I submit, is the resolu-
tion that is required by our Constitution.
Other constitutional commentators, such as Professor Kamisar,
have made exactly the opposite submission. What Professor Kamisar
and I are both doing, in effect, is presenting our conflicting views as to
how we think this very important issue should be resolved by the
Supreme Court. As with laws denying women the choice whether or
not to have an abortion, it is the Supreme Court that will ultimately
have to determine the constitutionality of laws that deny terminally ill
21. This is my "argumentative summary" of Professor Kamisar's position. See
Kamisar, supra note 6, at 39.
22. See the discussion in Sedler, Constitutional Challenges to Bans on 'Assisted Sui-
cide": The View from Without and Wthin, supra note 1, at 795-97.
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persons the choice to hasten inevitable death by the use of physician-
prescribed medications.
In resolving this issue, as in resolving the issue of constitutional
protection of abortion choice, the Court as an institution-and the
individual Justices who comprise it-will be engaging in constitutional
balancing and will make value judgments about the relative constitu-
tional importance of the conflicting individual and governmental inter-
ests.23 I see Roe v. Wade4 as a case where the Court clearly was
engaged in constitutional balancing and where the Court made the
value judgment that prior to viability, the women's interest in repro-
ductive freedom was constitutionally more important than the state's
asserted interest in protecting potential human life by means of
prohibiting abortion.25 My argument for the constitutional protec-
tion of the choice to hasten inevitable death asks the Court likewise to
engage in constitutional balancing and to hold that the terminally ill
person's interest in making the choice to hasten inevitable death is
constitutionally more important than any interest that the state can
assert to compell the person to "go on living."26 I also think that the
constitutional result-whether the Constitution will be held to protect
the choice to hasten inevitable death-depends on whether a major-
ity of the Justices will conclude that the rationale for the constitutional
protection of abortion choice that was recognized in Roe and Case) 7
applies in equal measure to the constitutional protection of the
choice to hasten inevitable death.2" It is my submission that it does,
and it is on this basis that I assert that the Constitution protects the
23. It is my submission that constitutional balancing and "non-interpretive re-
view" is a necessary postulate for constitutional adjudication in the American constitu-
tional system. See Robert A. Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in Constitutional Adjudication:
An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. LJ. 93, 120-36 (1983).
24. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
25. See Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution and Personal Autonomy: The Lauyering
Perspective, 11 COOLE'Y L. REv. 773, 787-92 (1994).
26. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
27. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
28. The results in the two cases presenting this question that have become before
appellate courts indicate that judges who disagree with the holding and rationale of
Roe v. Wade will not be disposed to extend that holding and rationale to provide con-
stitutional protection to the choice to hasten inevitable death. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, upheld the constitutionality
of Washington's ban on "assisted suicide." see Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49
F.3d 586, reh'g granted, 62 F.3d 299 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc). The majority opinion
was written by Judge John Noonan, who has been a relentless critic of Roe v. Wade. See
e.g.,John Noonan, The Root and Branch ofRoe v. Wade, 63 NEB. L. REv. 668 (1984). In
the Compassion in Dying opinion, Judge Noonan referred to the "abortion jurispru-
dence" of Roe and Casey as being "unique" and so it could not be "extrapolat[ed] to a
very different field." 49 F.3d at 591. Of the 5 Michigan Supreme Court Justices join-
ing in that court's holding in People v. Kevorkian; Hobbins v. Attorney General, 527
N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 714 (1995), at least 3 and possibly 4
have been critical of Roe. In the principal opinion for the Court, Chief Justice
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right of the terminally ill to make the choice to hasten inevitable
death.
Michael Cavanagh gave little consideration to Roe, and said that in Casey, the Supreme
court had "emphasized that abortion cases are unique." Id. at 729.
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